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INTRODUCTION 
During the last decades, all OECD countries have implemented public sector reforms to increase the 
efficiency and to enhance the effectiveness and performance of public organisations (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2000). These reforms have also taken place in higher education (HE), more or less to 
achieve the same objectives (Dobbins, Knill and Vögtle, 2011). The reforms OECD countries have 
been confronted with, have to a large extent been theoretically classified under the concept of New 
Public Management (NPM), emphasizing the accountability of the public sector and the focus on 
results (Hood, 1995).  
This paper discusses NPM and investigates its characteristics in HE. It is divided into three parts. First, 
the concept of NPM and its characteristics are discussed. In a second stage the implications of NPM 
in HE are illustrated. Finally, policy developments in HE in 10 countries will be discussed within the 
NPM framework. We conclude with a brief overview and evaluation of NPM in HE. 
 
NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: DIVERSITY UNDER THE SAME UMBRELLA 
In the late 1970s, financial crises, bureaucracy, the heaviness of administrative procedures, and a 
decreasing level of public trust increased the discontent with the public sector (Pollitt, Van Thiel, and 
Homburg, 2007). Since then, public sector organisations and administrations worldwide have been 
modernized in order to increase their efficiency and effectiveness, to enhance their performance and 
to orient their services more to the expectations of their citizens (customers). This discontent has led 
to the introduction of new, managerialist ideas in the public sector and has been called the New 
Public Management (Pollitt, Van Thiel and Homburg, 2007). The term NPM encompassed various 
new management styles (Hood, 1995). During the last decades, researchers worldwide have 
highlighted this trend and have investigated public sector reforms that have been carried out under 
the impulse of NPM principles. However, NPM is not a straightforward concept.  
First, NPM stands for the general idea that private practices, business concepts, techniques and 
values can improve public sector performance (Hood, 1995). This perspective actually states the 
superiority of private sector techniques assuming that its implementation in the public sector 
automatically leads to an improved performance. From the literature, the following list of basic 
principles of NPM can be derived (Ferlie, Musselin and Andresani, 2008; Gruening, 2001; Osborne, 
2006; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000): (1) an attention to lesson-drawing from private-sector 
management; (2) the presence of hands-on management and the organizational distance between 
policy implementation and policy making; (3) entrepreneurial leadership; (4) input and output 
controls, evaluation and performance management and audit; (5) the disaggregation of public 
services to their most basic units and a focus on their cost management; (6) the growth of the use of 
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markets, competition and contracts for resource allocation and service delivery within public 
services; (7) the will to treat service users as customers; and (8) the will to produce smaller, more 
efficient and results-oriented public sector organisations. During the last decades, many public sector 
organisations and administrations have been reforming according to (some of) those principles. As 
such, the basic idea of the reforms was highly comparable, which stresses some kind of uniformity.  
Second, NPM stands for not only a ‘general belief’ and a ‘basic idea’, but also for the various ways 
this general belief has been implemented in the concrete. In this sense, NPM is principally an 
umbrella concept, given the fact that the implementation has taken many forms and has been 
implemented with various levels of intensity and at different periods (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). 
This has also been argued by Pollitt et al. (2007, p. 4) who state that within Europe, the 
implementation of NPM can be likened to a ‘chameleon, constantly changing its appearance to blend 
with the local context’. Even in 1995 it was already assumed that NPM would take numerous shapes 
within the OECD (Hood, 1995). 
 
Since its emergence, NPM has had its opponents and advocates (Osborne, 2006). Hood (1991) posits 
that the advocates saw NPM as an answer to the old bureaucracy and as such as the best route to 
success to modernize the public sector (see also Pollitt and Dan, 2011). The pro-NPM literature 
assumes that the application of business methods will result in a public sector that is cheaper, more 
efficient, and more responsive to its ‘customers’ (Pollitt and Dan, 2011). The opponents, states Hood 
(1991), argue that NPM has been an assault on a valuable public service and is only a vague packet 
without real content. It has an intra-governmental focus in an increasingly pluralist world (Osborne, 
2006) and leads to side-effects such as fragmentation, diminished coordination, lower social 
cohesion and negative consequences on personnel (Hammerschmid, Van de Walle, Oprisor and 
Stimac, 2013). NPM is suggested to have a limited geographical reach, focusing on Anglo-American, 
Australasian and (some) Scandinavian arenas (Osborne, 2006). Regarding the impact of NPM, some 
scholars argue that NPM was a disappointment to governments who implemented NPM reforms: 
they were confronted with negative experiences with management consultancy, with performance 
measurements that were reduced to ‘happy sheets’ or ‘tick box exercises’, and with private ideas 
that were misfit to the peculiarities of the public sector (Curry, 2014).  
Pitching a side is difficult as empirical evidence regarding the outcomes and effects of NPM are 
scarce. As Pollitt and Dan (2011, pp. 51-52) state: “there have been endless publications concerned 
with NPM-like programmes and techniques. Yet, our solid, scientific knowledge of the general 
outcomes of all this thinking and activity is very limited”. In other words: NPM has to a large extent 
been investigated in terms of implementation and processes, but not in terms of outcomes. Little is 
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known about whether NPM ‘works’ and whether it actually results in increased efficiency and lower 
costs. 
 
This overall skepticism has led to a period of post-NPM paradigms. For instance, the concept of 
‘whole-of-government’ was introduced, emphasizing integration and coordination instead of the 
economic perspective and the perceived disaggregated effect of NPM reforms (Christensen and 
Laegreid, 2007). Another example is ‘digital-era-governance’, a concept emphasizing the role of IT-
centered changes and focusing on reintegration, needs-based holism and digitization, striving to 
reintegrate functions into the government thereby closely connecting technological, organizational, 
cultural and social effects (Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow and Tinkler, 2005). Another perspective is 
that of New Public Governance (NPG), wherein public management reforms are perceived as a 
variety of interactive forms of governing that are less ‘centered’ and are more based on interactivity, 
transparency, collaboration and participation between stakeholders and networks. NPG is often used 
as a new umbrella concept to define the difference between the new and older modes of governing 
(Osborne, 2006). As an umbrella concept, NPG encompasses a cluster of principles, such as process 
focus, co-ordination, participation and co-production (Torfing and Triantafillou, 2014). The three 
highlighted post-NPM concepts to a high degree emphasize the same elements: more integration, 
inter-connectedness, and inter-organizational networks. In this way, these newer concepts are a 
reaction to the economic principles and ideas underlying NPM.  
 
Now that we have defined NPM as a general concept, we can specify in the next paragraph what the 
characteristics of NPM are when applied to higher education. 
 
 
NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION  
 
Reforming HE 
Higher education institutions (HEIs) have during the last decades been subjected to many reforms, 
encouraged by the emergence of the knowledge society, economic crises, increased competition, 
and demographic evolutions (Dobbins, Knill and Vögtle, 2011). Within that context, European and 
other countries have been seeking new ways to steer the HE sector (de Boer and File, 2009). In the 
context of budgetary restrictions governments have been reducing their expenditure on HE and have 
increasingly introduced the market as a new coordination mechanism (Middlehurst and Teixeira, 
2012). Other management principles such as liberalisation and privatisation have also become part of 
HE governance in many countries (de Boer, Enders and Jongbloed, 2009; Broucker and De Wit, 2013). 
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Generally speaking, one could state that those reform tendencies aimed to increase the efficiency 
and the effectiveness of the HE sector in the same way governments have tried to do in other public 
sector organisations and policy domains. As a result, the principles of NPM have to large extent been 
introduced in HE in Europe and beyond, be it quite often partially. 
As a concept with clear roots in neo-liberalism, NPM became a general approach to governance and 
management in the public sector (Goedegebuure and Hayden, 2007). Through isomorphic processes, 
NPM also evolved into becoming a transnational myth about what constitutes a rational 
management structure for HEIs (Kretek et al., 2013). HEIs were from then on considered as 
organisations, rather than as sui generis collegial structures, with the company as an ideal type 
leading the direction of governance reforms (Kretek et al., 2013; Tahar and Boutellier, 2013). In other 
words, reforms based on NPM were introduced to transform a state-dependent organisation into a 
complete organisation wherein aspects as identity, hierarchy and rationality were introduced 
(Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson, 2000). In this context new university models emerged, such as the 
entrepreneurial university (Clark, 1998) and the adaptive university (Sporn, 1999). The governance 
reforms have mostly followed the route laid out by the NPM concept (de Boer et al., 2008; Bleiklie 
and Michelsen, 2013).  
However, the principles of NPM are not implemented in every HE sector in the same way or to the 
same degree (Broucker and De Wit, 2013), which is comparable with other sectors that have been 
subjected to NPM: “[t]here is no predominant model for higher education governance in Europe: 
diversity remains the hallmark of European higher education” (Eurydice, 2008, p. 104). In other 
words, the national context is important to understand HE governance in a given system, because 
“the same reform repertoire gives birth to interpretations that vary from one country and from one 
university to the other” (Paradeise, 2012, p. 596). As a result of the path dependency of the 
implementation of NPM (Dill, 2011), it seems that NPM, also in HE, is an umbrella or chameleon-like 
concept that can be used for various guises of governance reform. The question then is what 
characteristics can be identified when NPM is applied in HE?  
 
NPM- characteristics  
Several authors have summarized the characteristics NPM would have within HE. Marginson (2009) 
emphasizes corporatisation reform, growth in student fee-charging, an expansion of the role of 
private institutions, encouragement of commercial business activity in research, the creation of 
competition for parcels of government-provided resources, and output modeling. The OECD 
accentuates leadership principles, incentives, and competition between public sector agencies and 
private entities to enhance the outcomes and cost efficiency of public services (Hénard and Mitterle, 
2006). Bleiklie and Michelsen (2013) stress hierarchisation (leadership and management), budgetary 
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constraints, the formalization of evaluation, and the increased autonomy for institutions. Ferlie et al. 
(2008) arrive at a list of ten characteristics, including market-based reforms such as the stimulation of 
competition for students and funding and the encouragement of private sector providers; the 
development of real prices for student fees and research contracts; the development of audit and 
checking systems; and vertical steering with stronger and more overt managerialism. 
In sum, NPM in HE contains a wide range of characteristics, which can be classified under four broad 
areas. Although the delineation of these four areas is not clear-cut, they do offer a solid approach to 
analyse reforms in HE in different contexts. 
 
Table 4.1 NPM-areas in Higher Education 
 
Marginson (2009) Hénard and 
Mitterle (2006) 
Bleiklie and 
Michelsen (2013) 
Ferlie et al. (2008) 
Market-based 
reforms 
Role expansion of 
private institutions; 
encouragement of 
commercial activity; 
competition creation 
competition 
between public 
agencies and 
private entities  
 
competition for students and 
funding; market entrance 
encouragement and failure 
acceptability  
Budgetary 
reforms 
Growth in student fee-
charging 
Financial 
incentives 
Budgetary 
constraints 
Value for money; real prices 
development and introduction 
of higher student fees; 
hardening of soft budgetary 
constraints 
Autonomy, 
accountability 
and 
performance 
Output modeling Incentives 
Formalization of 
evaluation; more 
autonomy 
Performance measurement 
and monitoring; audit and 
checking systems; vertical 
steering  
New 
management 
style and new 
management 
techniques 
corporatization reform 
leadership 
principles 
Hierarchisation 
development of strong 
executive and managerial 
roles; reduction in faculty 
representation; local 
government influence 
reduction 
 
It is clear that NPM contains a diversity of elements, but in the actual implementation of reforms not 
every element needs to be implemented to the same extent to be able to call it an NPM reform (de 
Boer et al., 2008). In the next sections we discuss to what extent the four elements are present in 
some countries and what this means for HE, since, as Bleiklie already stated in 1998: “introducing 
these ideas in a public university system should make an apt case for the exploration of the potential 
and limitations of NPM as a universal approach to management reform. In Higher Education, where 
institutional autonomy and academic freedom are fundamental values, the compatibility between 
the rationale of the reform policies and the substantive field in which they are supposed to operate is 
posed more acutely than in most other policy fields” (p. 299).  
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AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON  
In this section we use the above classification to briefly discuss the core NPM elements in seven 
countries representing the different administrative traditions discerned by Bleiklie and Michelsen 
(2013): England, New Zealand and the United States for the Anglo-American tradition, the 
Netherlands and Flanders for the Germanic tradition, Portugal for the Napoleonic tradition, and 
Finland for the Scandinavian tradition. With this selection, we include both early NPM adopters (the 
Netherlands and especially England and New Zealand) and latecomers (Portugal, Finland). Next to 
those countries, we present results from three Eastern-Europe countries: Hungary, Latvia and 
Lithuania which can be characterized by a mixture of Germanic, Napoleonic and state centered 
former Socialist/Soviet traditions of higher education governance.  
 
Market based reforms 
Many OECD governments have moved towards increased marketisation of the HE sector, in a bid for 
the enhancement of efficiency and accountability, whilst reducing the financial burden for the 
government (Meek and Davies, 2009).  
In Portugal, throughout the 2000s changes have been framed within NPM (Magalhães et al., 2013; 
Kauko and Diogo, 2011). Based on OECD recommendations that HEIs should still be supported 
financially by the government, but should operate within the private sector, the government 
accorded in 2007 a new legal status to universities, together with a state budget drop urging them to 
generate more income (Kauko and Diogo, 2011). At the same time, the role of the provision of HE 
changed: the development of the private sector has been encouraged to cover the capacity lack in HE 
(Ferlie, Musselin and Andresani, 2008). This has increased competition between institutions for 
attracting students (Cardoso, Carvalho and Santiago, 2011). The question remains whether Portugal 
will evolve towards full liberalisation, with, among other things a deregulation of employment 
conditions for professors and researchers (Kauko and Diogo, 2011). In England increasing 
competitive pressure has been the key change (de Boer, Enders and Schimank, 2008), in the first 
place between existing HEIs, but also by allowing private providers to become degree-granting 
institutions. These private activities – sometimes established in partnership with public HEIs – “blur 
existing boundaries around the sector with the result that it is both more diverse, more flexible, and 
in a number of cases, less accountable” (Robertson, 2010, p. 31). The implementation of NPM 
principles has involved cutting budgets and tightening controls, creating internal competition, and 
introducing monitoring mechanisms (Shattock, 2008). This scenario was implemented at the system 
level but had an equivalent impact on the institutional level, leading to an emphasis on the primacy 
of management over bureaucratic procedures, towards monitoring of performance and auditing 
quality, and to the establishment of (financial) targets (Shattock, 2008). This is comparable to the 
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United States where HE is basically characterised by strong competition (Slaughter and Cantwell, 
2011; Ramirez and Christensen, 2013). The US HE system is highly complex with 4350 accredited 
degree-granting colleges and universities which range from public to private for-profit institutions, 
two-year community colleges to doctoral degree-granting institutions. HEIs have undergone a 
transformation since the early 1980s (AASCU 2010). The boundary between university and external 
environment has become much less defined due to government policies and institutional strategies 
encouraging more interactions with the market (Bok, 2003; Geiger, 2004; Leisyte and Dee, 2012; 
Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).  Competition in the US has been strongly underpinned by competition 
for students as they are key in generating income , whereby the constant increase in fee levels over 
the years has intensified the competition. As noted by Geiger and Heller (2011, p. 9-10) the ‘beauty 
contest’ has increased competition and the university gaming with tuition fees, aid and various other 
market-oriented phenomena in US higher education. The top HEIs have been participating in the 
‘arms race’ for the best students and have been increasing their costs of education, whereby the 
belief has been created that the higher the spending, the more likely to attract the best students, and 
the better the quality of education (Ibid.). In contrast to many European HE systems, US universities 
enjoy a high degree of autonomy demonstrated in limited governmental funding and low degrees of 
regulation. Another important feature is strong central management on the one hand and strong 
disciplinary departments on the other. Professional management of US universities and their 
entrepreneurial orientation has been well accounted for in the literature (Bok, 2005, Geiger and Sa 
2008, Leisyte and Dee, 2012).  
In the Netherlands, the concept of ‘steering at a distance’ was introduced in 1985, meaning that the 
government only defines the general framework for HE (de Boer, Enders and Schimank, 2008). 
Incentives-based funding has led to market-type behavior and a more distinct profiling by the HEIs 
(ib.). In other words, HEIs were re-defined as strategic actors that have to take responsibility for 
“maintaining quality, providing an adequate range of teaching and research programmes, and 
ensuring access to higher education” (Maassen, Moen and Stensaker, 2011, p. 487). In Finland 
universities have traditionally been under strict legal control as they were in fact part of the national 
administration. However, a new law was drawn up over 2008-2009 introducing an entrepreneurial 
culture. The main aim was to increase autonomy for universities, “which will be afforded legal status 
in their own right, and will have much increased financial freedom” (Aarrevaara et al., 2009, p. 5).  
In Hungary the HE system is institutionally diversified, with state and non-state universities, and  
state and non-state colleges (Jongbloed et al., 2008). The establishment and operation of HEIs are 
regulated by the 2005 Higher Education Act. Every institution may launch academic programmes 
after consent of the Hungarian Accreditation Committee (Jongbloed et al., 2008). The number of 
students admitted is limited. The Ministry of Education announces the number of state-financed 
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places in each study field. Institutions can open further places according to their capacity where the 
students pay the cost of the education. Hungary has a highly developed, but small, system of private 
HE. Non-state institutions must gain state recognition and approval, but it is said that this is a long 
and bureaucratic process (Singh & Marcucci, 2008). In 2005 the allocation of state-funded bachelor 
students changed. Instead of using a quota system to limit the number of students for each 
institution and subject area, quotas were set for major study fields: students were ranked by their 
secondary school results. Those with results good enough to be within the quota would be state-
financed and the institutions to which they are admitted would receive the funding “attached” to the 
students. This would increase competition. This new system seems to be more performance 
oriented: in the old system, places were allocated among institutions and all institutions got state-
funded places. Weaker institutions were usually selected by less talented students. In the new 
system students with the best result select first and their choices determine the allocation of state-
funded places. 
In general, the Law on Education from 1991 determined the overall structure of Latvian HE. In this 
act, the establishment of private HEIs was allowed followed by the introduction of tuition fees. As a 
result, the HE system in Latvia contains both public and private higher education providers. The 
public sector is the largest (Jongbloed et al., 2008). In general, the influx of students  since 1997 has 
been made possible by expanding the existing institutions, and by creating new institutions. 
Important here is the expansion of the private sector, and the creation of regional HEIs. Although the 
legal framework concerning external quality assurance is equal for public and private higher 
education institutions, there are still differences as to the institutional autonomy of these 
institutions, not least in their management structure, and in how detailed they are regulated. For 
example, while private higher education institutions can choose freely which language a given study 
programme may be taught in, this is much more limited for the public institutions.  Private higher 
education institutions, with some exceptions, do not receive state budget funding. Both public and 
private higher education institutions charge tuition fees, and the institutions can decide on the level 
of fees themselves (Jongbloed et al., 2008). 
In Lithuania reforms influenced by NPM – or at least, changes in the policy rhetoric – have started in 
2000s (Leisyte and Kizniene, 2006). After regaining its independence in 1990, Lithuania has 
restructured all is public sectors, including higher education. The Law on Science and Higher 
Education of 1991 defined the boundaries of state regulation and granted the universities full 
autonomy (Leisyte and Kizniene, 2006). The Lithuanian Law on Higher Education (2000) defined the 
governing structure of HE. The Government, the Ministry of Education and Science, the Parliament 
(Seimas) and a number of specialist organizations such as the Lithuanian Science Council, the Rectors’ 
conference and the Centre for Quality Assessment were then important actors involved in steering 
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higher education institutions. A  retreat from regulation to more output-oriented approaches of state 
guidance could be observed from 2009 on, when the new Law of Higher Education (2009) 
decentralized higher education governance. The new law has liberalized the ‘market’ of higher 
education by allowing high tuition fees and introducing a ‘student voucher’ system, as well as by 
introducing more performance orientation with regard to research. The accession to the EU in 2005 
and the consequent availability of funding through the EU’s Structural Funds has further increased 
the drive for competition in the Lithuanian higher education sector (Leisyte et al. 2014). At the same 
time, new performance monitoring instruments have been put in place (also with the help of EU 
Structural Funds) in the period 2009-2014, which have increased accountability of universities to the 
state. 
New Zealand adopted already in the 1980s neo-liberalism into its HE. It was argued that differences 
in the social status of different kinds of institutions was outdated and “buttressed by funding regimes 
that awarded universities higher levels of government support” (Strathdee, 2011, p. 28). The 
guaranteed funding for HEIs was abolished, government funding was made more equal across 
different kinds of institutions offering similar kinds of training, and a system of tuition fees was 
introduced (Strathdee, 2011). This led to a quasi-market in HE, but had unintended effects 
(Strathdee, 2011): many new providers opted to offer degrees in competition with universities, and 
the cost of provision to the state grew enormously. In reaction, new policies were introduced in 
1999. From then on, the government could determine what kind of training and how much of this 
training can be offered by HE providers; and research funding was concentrated in research intensive 
institutions (Strathdee, 2011).  
Market-based reforms are unlikely to happen in Flanders (Broucker and De Wit, 2013), where 
liberalization and privatization do not get a foot on the ground and the HE system continues to be 
strongly state regulated. Private providers can enter the market, but need to comply with strict 
regulations including for instance coming to an agreement with an existing HEI and getting 
recognition from the government, which makes entrance to the ‘market’ highly conditional and far 
from obvious. 
 
Budgetary reforms 
Budgetary reforms to steer on performance whilst granting more autonomy is perceived as a typical 
NPM tool. In most countries the state remains the main funder, albeit that funding is allocated on 
both input and output indicators and in competitive ways (Jongbloed, 2008).  
Although the recent Finnish reforms have turned universities into independent legal entities with 
more possibilities to seek private funding, the state remains the principal source of income (Kauko 
and Diogo, 2011; Aarrevaara et al., 2009). Also in Portugal, public HE has traditionally relied on state 
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funding, whereas private institutions only can rely on state scholarships for their students (File, 
2008). From the mid-1990s onwards, government policies have increased the focus on competition 
for research funds and have promoted public-private partnerships (Magalhães and Santiago, 2011). 
Since 2005, the allocation mechanism became progressively based on performance and quality 
indicators, but due to frequent changes in the criteria, little has changed in terms of the budget each 
HEI receives (Teixeira, 2010). The competition for funding is, as already highlighted above, very 
strong in England, especially through the Research Assessment Exercise or Research Excellence 
Framework as it is now called. Introduced in 1986, this research assessment clearly installed 
competition between institutions (Robertson, 2010). The overall funding system changed even 
further in 1992 when the polytechnics were relabeled as universities, a decision followed by budget 
cuts and the increase in tuition fees for students up to 25% of the cost of an average study 
programme (Robertson, 2010). Finally, in 2012, student fees were increased, capped at GBP 9 000 per 
year (Eurydice, 2014). 
This competitive context for funding can also be seen in the US: while in the 1990s performance 
funding was popular, it was dropped by several states during the mid-2000s. However, these policies 
have re-emerged after the recession.  Since 2013, 33 governors have committed to pursuing 
performance funding and results-oriented efforts for HE (Rutherford and Rabovski, 2014). States use 
performance-based funding systems as a way to deal with decreasing state funding and increasing 
pressure to improve performance. Under these systems, institutions are funded based on 
performance measures such as credit-hour completion and graduation rates (Leisyte and Enders, 
2013). Next to state-funding, colleges and universities have funds from different sources, such as 
tuition and fee payments, grants, contracts from governments, private gifts, and so on (Eckel and 
King, 2004). The main trends in terms of competition among institutions in the US have been a 
constant increase in student fees they charge as well as mission drift towards competing for the best 
human resources and federal research grants (Leisyte and Dee, 2012). However, a distinction has to 
be made between public and private institutions when it comes to fee levels. At the same time, even 
if we explore public HEIs in the US, the difference in ratio between the income generated from the 
state and that from private sources is large compared to the situation for European institutions 
(Leisyte and Dee, 2012). In the US public HEIs (depending on the state) may receive around 15% of its 
income from the state, while in the European context, the public HEIs receive sometimes 90% of 
their income from state sources (Leisyte and Dee, 2012). Having low dependency on the state purse 
makes US universities much more dependent on the market (such as private donations, private 
foundations,  contract research, tuition fees and their endowments). The US federal budget for HE is 
determined yearly and this budget is the main source of needs-based financial aid for students and 
for the appropriations of the community colleges.  
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In the Netherlands, according to de Boer, Enders and Schimank (2008, p. 44), “the tools of 
government increasingly changed from directives to financial incentives”, with performance funding 
and contractual relations between state and HEIs on the rise. Government funding consists of a 
closed envelope distributed on the basis of performance indicators such as the number of degrees 
and PhD’s awarded, the establishment of research schools, and strategic research funding (de Weert 
and Boezerooy, 2007). 
Hungary changed its funding system over the years, starting with the introduction of formula funding 
in 1996 (Jongbloed, de Boer, Enders & File, 2008), which was mainly input-based. In 2001 the 
possibility for students to get a loan was introduced. The system applied an interest close to the 
market interest rate, which made it, from a government perspective, self-sustainable (Jongbloed et 
al., 2008). In 2005, the formulate funding was adjusted to the Bologna-system. Next to that, a debate 
took place on student contributions, introduced in 2006 to be abolished again in 2008. At the same 
time it was made possible for students to gain the status of “cost-covering” (self-financed): students 
who were not state-funded were admitted to the system. The number of cost-covering students is 
limited by the institution’s capacity (Jongbloed et al., 2008).  In the years 2012 and 2013, the budget 
for education has been reduced significantly (Berács, Rubos, Kováts & Temesi, 2014). The state fund 
withdrawals were supported by the "self-supporting higher education" concept, but in December 
2012 the students found the situation so unacceptable that they demanded negotiations. As a result 
of the negotiations the number and the distribution of state-funded places slightly changed 
compared to the original concepts. In addition, since 2012, new students may opt for a restricted-use 
loan at 2% interest for financing the tuition fee - in addition to the traditional loan (see above) at an 
interest rate of 7.5% (Eurydice, 2015). Furthermore, the government representative formulated a 
new strategic vision for November 2013. This agreement includes new elements only concerning the 
distribution and does not stop the withdrawal of state funds. By 2014 this resulted in the reduction 
of the direct expenditure of the budget on higher education by a third in five years. This process was 
not accompanied by the clarification of funding principles. Nowadays, the HEIs have started 
implementing ad hoc survival strategies (Berács et al., 2014). 
In 2001, Latvia introduced formula funding to improve results and outcomes: funding is allocated on 
the basis of a contract between the individual institutions and the ministry responsible for that 
institution.  For many HEIs the income from the state funding system only cover for less than half of 
the budget. In addition, the state budget is channeled through various ministries who have 
ownership of certain institutions. Furthermore, regional authorities and municipalities may also fund 
institutions. In general, this creates a very diversified funding system, which on the one hand is 
beneficial for institutions to be able to increase their total funding through parallel funding, but 
which on the other hand is making control and monitoring of resources difficult. Since January 2009 
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institutional autonomy concerning the possibility to reallocate resources internally has increased. 
Funding is currently given through a lump-sum, and institutions are free to use this autonomously. 
This also includes institutional autonomy in how to spend the income generated from tuition 
(Jongbloed et al., 2008). In 2014, the Ministry of Education and Science has prepared a draft concept 
for a new financing model. It preserves financing study places as a basis for system stability and 
sustainability, but it also includes additional performance-based funding, as well as targeted funding 
for strategic objectives and innovation. However, in order to implement this new model an increase 
of investment in HE is necessary. Therefore, the Ministry has requested additional funding for the 
new financing model from 2015 (Eurydice, 2015). 
In Lithuania there were attempts to introduce performance-based agreements between the 
universities and the Minister of Education and Science in 2000s. Initially these were agreements 
regarding the number of students to be educated in different disciplines and there were attempts to 
introduce changes to the formula funding of universities. However, in practice, this was not 
implemented due to an extensive lobby processes of various stakeholders (Dobbins and Leisyte, 
2014). At the same time university budgets have increasingly diversified by including tuition fees, 
service contracts as well as contract research. However, this has changed after the 2009 Law on 
Higher Education, which has strengthened the output orientation of HE funding. After the 2000 HE 
Law, public HE institutions were increasingly financed from the state budget through lump-sum 
budgets. Allocations to institutions were determined according to the formula funding, where 50% of 
funds were based on historical earmarking and the remaining 50% was calculated according to the 
increase in student numbers, demand for research and capital activities, teacher qualifications and 
the ratio of students per teacher. Since the HE Law 2009 the funding allocations have shifted towards 
a formula with a stronger mixture of input- and output-based indicators, where research 
performance is becoming more important (Dobbins and Leisyte, 2014). Today the most important 
sources of income at the discretion of universities are contract research and student fees. The HE 
Law 2009 introduced student vouchers, and tuition fees were sharply increased for all students 
varying per discipline (Ibid.). Funding for research is allocated to universities from the state budget 
based on a formula in which output indicators such as the number of journal publications and 
produced PhD degrees are important. 
Given the criticism on neo-liberalism in New Zealand, in 2002 it was decided that the government 
only funds providers to deliver HE according to individual ‘investment plans’ (designed to increase 
differences between different types of providers and to increase the labor market relevance of the 
training provided). Investment plans are developed by all providers and set out the areas wherein 
providers are to offer training and detail the number of state-funded places that can be offered to 
students in each institution. Besides, to limit the cost of tuition to students, a fee-maxima policy was 
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introduced (Strathdee, 2011). At this point, every university is part-funded (around 50 per cent of 
total income) by the Government (Ministry of Education, 2015). 
The government in Flanders introduced a new funding mechanism in 2009, thereby moving clearly 
away from input financing and toward output financing. No longer the number of students, but 
criteria such as the number of degrees awarded and research performance indicators (publications, 
citations, …) are used to distribute funding among the HEIs. Nevertheless, although resource 
allocation has become more competitive, the state remains by far the main funding body for higher 
education (Broucker & De Wit, 2013). 
 
Autonomy, accountability and performance 
HE has, in many countries, shifted from a state control model to a state supervisory model (Neave 
and Van Vught, 1991; Meek and Davies, 2009). This has enlarged the freedom of HEIs, increasing 
significantly their autonomy, but moderated by accountability (Meek and Davies, 2009).  
The Netherlands introduced this idea in 1985, when the government declared its ’steering at a 
distance’ policy. This strategy was adopted by law in 1993 implementing a transition from ex-ante 
standards and rules to ex post evaluation, implying accountability and performance. This increased 
autonomy and accountability, while the government retained strong correctional powers. Both 
internal and external evaluations of teaching and research are obligatory, and as of 2007 a 
supervisory board of external stakeholders, appointed by the minister, was installed for each 
institution (de Boer et al., 2010). The relationship between HEIs and the government has increasingly 
become a contractual relationship: HEIs develop strategic plans but within parameters negotiated 
with the government (de Boer, Enders and Schimank, 2008). This kind of reform is not 
straightforward for all countries: for instance, in Finland, management by results has been 
implemented to increase the performance of HEIs. According to Kauko and Diogo (2011) this system 
is opposed, as it has been implemented as in other public sector domains, forced by the Ministry of 
Finance, and without taking the peculiarities of universities into account. In England governmental 
pressure on HEIs has been intensified, albeit starting from a point where government intervention 
was very low. The ‘British exception’ of independence from the state has gradually been overruled by 
state intervention and even implied “state micro-management on a scale comparable to other 
European systems” (Shattock, 2008). In the process research funding has become heavily reliant on 
indicators. Also in teaching and education evaluation indicators have become part and parcel of HE 
policies, through quality assessment of subjects and institutional audits. The results of these 
assessments are published and can, as such, lead to reputational consequences influencing the level 
of income (Capano, 2011). In Portugal HEIs “are able to determine their own mission and strategy 
but within a policy framework and set of regulations that constrain their choices, mainly because the 
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public funding has been reduced progressively” (de Boer and File 2009, p. 30). There is state 
interference in that an accreditation system was put in place for both study programmes and 
institutions, a minimal number of students for study programmes was introduced, and in the 
allocation system quality indicators were included (Magalhães and Santiago, 2011). HEIs have also 
been made more accountable to external stakeholders (see also above): an executive council has 
been established with almost a third of members being external stakeholders, on top of the 
verticalisation of internal decision-making (Teixeira, 2010). 
Before 2005, state-owned institutions in Hungary had to operate as budgetary organizations. In 
2005, The Higher Education Act improved the financial autonomy of HEIs, not by changing their 
general position, but by empowering them to take financial decisions easier. For instance, 
institutions were allowed to retain and accumulate residual amounts, to keep their own income in a 
separate account (Jongbloed et al., 2008). Apart from that, performance contracts were introduced 
in 2006, wherein the Ministry guarantees an agreed flow of funds for three years, as a result of 
negotiations between each institution and the Ministry. The HEIs take the responsibility to increase 
their performance, while goal achievement and progress is monitored (Jongbloed et al., 2008). 
Despite those efforts, Hungary continues to be characterized by a general lack of transparency and 
inadequate funding, increasing institutions’ dependency and vulnerability (Berács et al., 2014). In 
general, their autonomy has narrowed, certainly regarding organization and management (e.g. 
ministerial appointment of rectors and general directors for management, appearance of financial 
inspectors). Indeed, the government plays a key role in the governance of higher education as they 
fulfil tasks regarding organisation, development and legality control  (Eurydice, 2015). 
In Latvia, the law was amended in 2006 establishing all state higher education institutions as 
“autonomous public entities”. This created a more clarified relationship between Ministry and HEIs. 
It is currently expected that the Ministry regularly develops a more overarching and long-term policy 
and strategy for higher education, while HEI have formulated and implemented their own strategies 
and plans. As a result, HEIs are currently independent legal bodies: they can take initiatives to 
establish a more diversified funding base.  
In Lithuania after 1990 universities regained their autonomy from the state in certain areas (Leisyte 
and Kizniene, 2006). They are free to design their own policies and strategic plans as well as govern 
themselves, they are free to develop their curriculum, to select their students and appoint academic 
staff. However, they have to follow the Law on Higher Education 2009 in terms of governance 
arrangements of university boards and quality assurance procedures. Further, they are subject to 
state monitoring via capacity reviews carried out by the State Monitoring Agency. The accountability 
of universities to external funding bodies such as the Lithuanian Research Council lies in the form of 
progress reports of the funded projects. When it comes to state steering of research, it takes place 
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via various funding instruments, especially through the National Science Programmes and the 
Programme of National Science Valleys, which have provided significant funding for research 
infrastructure development for selected universities. 
The changes introduced in New Zealand created a new approach to funding and monitoring. As 
already stated, the government invests in areas of education that meet its strategic objectives 
(Freeman, 2014). Institutions must have charters that outline a provider’s contribution to HE and to 
its stakeholders, and that reflect regional variations in the demand for skills. In turn, this feeds into 
the policies and practices of the universities, which invest in areas that match the priorities 
established by the government. An important new method which increased HE performance is the 
publishing since 2008 of the external evaluation and review of providers, and which contributed to 
the government’s future funding decisions. As a result this is truly a performance based funding 
system (Ministry of Education, 2015). In addition, other performance information (e.g. retention and 
completion rates) about HE providers were made more widely available to allow students and 
employers to make informed decisions about education, and to create an incentive for providers to 
improve performance (Strathdee, 2011). 
Some of the above described elements can also be seen in the US: the last few decades policy-
makers have demanded the universities to account for their performance, and public universities are 
required to collect, report, and analyze data across a wide range of performance indicators 
(Rutherford and Rabovski, 2014). Further, reporting regarding the performance has been an 
important instrument for strategic decision-makers within the institutions. The changes in the 
governance arrangements also have implied giving autonomy to public institutions in the area of 
tuition setting and reducing the powers of the statewide coordinating boards (McLendon, 2003). As 
discussed in Leisyte and Dee (2012), the massification in enrollments led many states to create 
consolidated governing boards or state coordinating boards to enhance rationality and efficiency in 
the use of resources and to plan across institutional sectors. It is suggested that this trend led to both 
greater decentralization and great centralization at the same time (Eckel and Morphew, 2009). 
Decentralization occurs with the greater autonomy of universities from the statewide coordinating 
boards and this gives university administrators the possibility to set the strategic priorities for their 
institutions. At the same time, this decentralization may lead to centralization of internal governance 
if the authority of institutional management is enhanced (Leisyte and Dee, 2012). As greater 
autonomy means greater accountability, the administration gains authority via the usage of various 
indicators of productivity and efficiency, such as graduation rates and faculty workloads (Dill, 2001). 
Universities depend strongly on their Boards of Trustees as well as the state Boards when it comes to 
state HEIs (Dee 2006, Dill 2001). Certain priorities set by the state may have an impact on the state 
funding for specific research areas - which indirectly can steer the activities of university researchers. 
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In the US the States are responsible for higher education policy. The federal government is largely 
responsible for the student financial aid programmes as well as for the research funding through its 
agencies. The priorities of federal funding agencies have a similar effect when it comes to steering 
research priorities. However, when it comes to the internal governance of universities, they are quite 
autonomous from the federal and state governmental steering. 
While the National Research Council conducts an elaborate ranking exercise for graduate programs 
approximately once per decade (Hicks, 2009), the far more ubiquitous rankings are produced by US 
News and World Report. Rankings do not have direct financial implications, but constitute a quasi-
objective, third-party assessment of institutional quality, and therefore can convey prestige to the 
institutions that acquire high ratings and thus have indirect effects. Bastedo and Bowman (2011) 
found that university rankings in 1998 significantly predicted financial measures in 2006. After 
controlling for prior reputation, higher rankings were associated with attracting larger amounts of 
research funding from government and industry, and obtaining donations from a higher proportion 
of alumni (Leisyte and Dee, 2012).  
The funding that HEIs in Flanders receive from the government, both the lump sum basic funding and 
the funding distributed competitively through research funds, is for the most part awarded as a lump 
sum to the institutions. This leaves the HEIs with some discretionary powers in how to spend the 
funding. Since the state reforms of the 1990s, deregulation and autonomy were indeed key principles 
in higher education reform, albeit coupled with accountability (De Wit & de Boer, 2010). HEIs are 
free to determine content, teaching methods, and research programmes, although funding priorities 
and financial incentives made available by the government may have an impact (De Wit & de Boer, 
2010). 
 
New management style 
The last broad area of NPM relates to the introduction of a new management style, typified by 
corporatization, verticalisation, hierarchisation, leadership, and the demise of representative 
governance structures.  
Portugal implemented several changes regarding their governmental bodies in HEI’s. First, HEI’s 
should be governed by a government-appointed board of trustees (Kauko and Diogo, 2011). Rectors 
used to be elected by the university assembly, but would now be elected by secret ballot by the 
General Council. Second, university senates, formerly the governing body in Portugese HEI’s, lost 
power and sometimes even disappeared (Kauko and Diogo, 2011). Third, in addition to academic and 
student representatives, 30% of members of the General Council should consist of individuals who 
do not belong to the institution. Finally, administrative councils have been replaced by management 
boards with identical responsibilities: administrative, financial and human resources management of 
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the institution (Kauko and Diogo, 2011). In Finland, public universities have a board, a rector and a 
university collegiate body. The highest executive body, the board, would consist of 7 to 14 members, 
of whom at least 40% are external stakeholders. The rector is elected by the board and holds the 
main executive power. In private institutions, the main organs are the board, the rector and an 
“overall multi-member administrative body”. The latter can be compared to the collegiate body of a 
public university. The rector is elected by the board and has approximately the same executive 
power as rectors in public universities. One of the most significant changes was the re-formulation of 
the rector’s position: while this person used to be elected by the university community, he has now 
become more or less a CEO responsible to the board (Kauko and Diogo, 2011). Countries like the 
Netherlands also passed new laws and created similar university boards, who would consist, partly 
or exclusively of non-university members, and were expected “to play the role of an American board 
of trustees, while setting priorities, approving budget and validating strategies” (Ferlie et al., 2008, p. 
334). In the Netherlands, this had led to centralization of decision-making at the top of HEIs, 
increased executive leadership, and a declining role for collegial bodies (de Boer and File, 2009; de 
Boer, Enders and Schimank, 2008). In England corporate management was strengthened; at the post-
1992 universities’ (former polytechnics) managerialism was at the heart of governance reforms, but 
also later in the pre-1992 universities this seemed to comply best with the exigencies of funding 
councils (Shattock, 2008). The allocation of resources and the drawing up of quality rankings has 
increased pressures on academic staff to do more with less (Deem, 2011). There are also internal 
pressures in the form of “explicit and overt management of academic staff and their work by 
academic managers and career administrators” (Deem, 2011, p. 48). In sum, this has resulted in a 
verticalisation of internal decision-making and a weakening of the collegial power of the academic 
bodies, and externally in more competition and institutional differentiation. Nevertheless, although 
collegial governance is under threat, it seems that top and middle management have acted in favor 
of traditional academic values and practices. Managers often are manager-academics pursuing 
policies in response to external pressures but with respect for academic traditions (de Boer, Enders 
and Schimank, 2008), whilst asserting their ‘right to manage’ (Deem and Brehony, 2008).  
In Hungary a  decrease in policy priority towards education has been observable, partly because 
governmental responsibility for HE had been divided among several ministries. The appointment of a 
new minister of state for higher education has somehow ameliorated the relationship between 
ministry and institutions, though significant change did not happen (Berács et al., 2014). The Higher 
Education Act of 1993 prescribed the internal structure of HEIs, including the responsibilities 
assigned to each governing body. With the integration process in 2000, the internal governance 
structure was not legally modified: the Senate remains the main decision-making body and the 
powers of the executives (rector, dean) remain as they were before. Nevertheless, in the period 
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1996–2005 the HEIs have been trying to modernize their management structure. The Higher 
Education Act of 2005 made it possible for institutions to decide on their governmental structure. In 
practice however, most old academic and decision-making structures stay intact (Jongbloed et al., 
2008). 
In Latvia, the Constitution (Satversme) of a HEI (representatives of academic staff, students and 
other groups of employees) is the main legal act regulating its activities. The Satversme establishes, 
among other things, the legal status, objectives and spheres of activities, rights, duties and tasks of 
representative, management and decision-making institutions, and so on. In general, it is the Saeima 
(the Parliament) who approves constitutions of state-founded higher education institutions, while 
the Cabinet of Ministers approves those of other institutions. Important here is that the new law of 
2006 reduced the number of decision-making bodies inside higher education institutions, and paved 
the way for new councils (up to the individual institutions to establish) intended to strengthen the 
strategic capabilities of the institutions. These councils consist of both external and internal 
representation and perceive as key task a greater adaptability to societal needs. 
In Lithuania universities increasingly depend on external stakeholders in their management (Dobbins 
and Leisyte, 2013, Leisyte and Kizniene, 2006). The role of students and other stakeholders in 
institutional management has increased the passing of the HE Law in 2000, which stipulates their 
participation in senate decision-making. With the HE Law of 2009, the university boards were 
established which have decision-making powers and appoint the university rector. The management 
at universities in this way has been gradually centralized, although the powers of collegial-decision 
making are still quite strong despite the NPM-oriented reforms of the past decade (Leisyte et al. 
2014). University rectors after the 2009 Law are appointed by the university boards which also have 
more powers in getting involved in strategic planning of the university. 
In New Zealand universities are autonomous, meaning that they are independently managed and 
governed by a council drawn from the community, business, staff and the student body, together 
with local and central government representatives (Ministry of Education, 2015). As a result, the 
councils are constituted to represent various interests and to be properly representative of the wider 
community (Edwards, 2000). 
In the US, the situation is quite diverse since states are responsible for governing public colleges and 
universities (Eckel and King, 2004): some institutions have constitutional autonomy, others have 
elected boards of trustees. In some states, a governing board is appointed by the governor, while in 
others the state board only plays an advisory function (Eckel and King, 2004). Interesting is that “the 
trustees or regents are largely comprised of corporate CEOs and professionals external to academe”. 
(Slaughter and Cantwell, 2011, p. 593). One of the major developments in terms of the internal 
governance has been the changing influence of traditional faculty governance processes. University 
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trustees and policymakers have criticized the slow pace of decision making; they have issued calls for 
streamlining decision-making procedures so that institutions can respond more rapidly to emerging 
opportunities in the external environment (Association of Governing Boards, 1996). Other observers 
have called for bypassing existing governance committees to rely instead on administratively-
appointed planning groups (Leisyte and Dee, 2012). In addition, the streamlining of the Boards of 
Trustees has also been on the policy making agenda at HEIs although it started as a self-resignation 
exercise back in 1987. In this line, the recent development of decreasing the number of members in 
Boards of Trustees is a prime example: that too many trustees make the decision-making process 
cumbersome and ‘burden’ the Board (Stripling, 2012). 
In Flanders collegial governance has remained strong. Many of the governing bodies include a 
representation of internal and external stakeholders, but these are elected and decision-making is 
largely collegial (De Wit, 2006). Governance structures have largely remained stable, with as guiding 
principles “collegiate governance, participative governance, openness towards external stakeholders, 
and elected managers” (ib. p. 19). Moreover, in Flanders there is no obligation for HEIs to perform 
long-term strategic planning. With the introduction as of 2015 of institutional audits as part of the 
quality assurance system, the institutions might feel the need to centralize goal-setting and 
supervision, but this remains a question for the future. 
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Overview 
The table below provides an overview of the described countries.  
 
Table 4.2 Overview international comparison 
 Market Budget Autonomy Management 
England Increase in internal 
competition; 
growth of private 
initiatives 
State budget drop; 
strong competition 
for funding 
More government 
interference; use of 
indicators and 
quality assessment 
Strengthened 
executive leadership 
(‘managerialism’) 
Portugal Increase in internal 
competition; 
promotion of 
private sector 
State budget drop; 
increase in 
performance- and 
competition-based 
funding 
Autonomy for HEIs 
but within a clear set 
of rules including 
quality indicators 
Strengthened 
executive leadership 
(board with external 
members) 
Netherlands Market-type 
behavior by HEIs; 
institutional 
profiling 
Increase in 
performance-based 
funding; contractual 
relations 
‘Steering at a 
distance’; increase in 
ex post-evaluation 
and quality 
assessment 
Strengthened 
executive leadership 
(Decentralization of 
decision-making) 
Flanders Highly conditional 
‘market’ 
Output funding Increased autonomy 
within policy 
framework 
Strong collegial 
governance 
Finland HEIs under strict 
legal control 
State as main funder; 
some private funding 
possible 
Increased 
autonomy; 
management by 
results 
Strengthened 
executive leadership 
(position of rector, 
board with external 
members) 
New Zealand Diminishing 
marketization; 
increasing 
competition 
State as main funder; 
investments plans; 
fee-maxima policy; 
performance based 
funding 
Use of performance 
information; 
autonomy but within 
governments’ vision 
Independent council, 
representative for 
the wider community 
US Strong market 
competition 
Performance funding; 
funding dependent 
on the market 
Low state 
interference 
Diversity among 
states; decrease in 
number of trustees 
Hungary HEIs under state 
control; increased 
competition 
between students 
Introduction of 
students loans; 
withdrawal of state 
funding; ad hoc 
funding strategies  
More performance 
contracts, but strong 
vulnerability and 
limited autonomy 
Fragmented 
governmental 
responsibility; senate 
is main decision 
making body 
Latvia Expansion private 
HEIs 
Contract funding; 
highly diversified 
funding system 
Increased autonomy Constitution is main 
body; trends towards 
a reduction of 
decision making 
bodies; creation of 
new councils with 
representation of 
stakeholders 
Lithuania Increased 
competition 
between 
institutions 
Shift to more output 
and performance 
funding 
More performance 
oriented, increased 
autonomy and 
accountability 
measures 
Still strong collegial 
decision-making; 
importance of 
internal and external 
stakeholders 
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VISIBLE TRENDS  
In this paper we have provided a descriptive overview of NPM-related reforms in 10 countries, which 
can be divided in 5 clusters: the Anglo-American tradition (England, New Zealand and the United 
States), the Germanic tradition (the Netherlands and Flanders), the Napoleonic tradition (Portugal), 
the Scandinavian tradition (Finland) and Eastern-Europe countries with a mixed set of characteristics 
(Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania). What patterns of reform can we identify in the 5 clusters?  
First, it seems that there is a wave within the Anglo-American tradition. While England and the 
United States have already since decades a strong neoliberal culture, with high autonomy, high 
competition and low state interference and they both seem to pursue in that direction, it seems that 
New Zealand is drifting away from the pure neoliberal discourse that NPM would suggest. Indeed, as 
an early adopter, it seems that New Zealand is moving towards characteristics that could be 
addressed to NPG: diminishing marketization, a representative decision making body, a renewal of 
state interference but in dialogue with HEIs. In other words: characteristics as collaboration and 
participation have been created to counteract a pure market oriented perspective of higher 
education. As an early adopter it could be that New Zealand has been confronted as one of the first 
with the more negative consequences of NPM and has therefore decided to seek for other forms of 
governance and steering of the system.  
Second, the Germanic, Napoleonic and Scandinavian traditions don’t show a clear-cut picture. While 
the Netherlands seem to move towards more marketization, more competition and apparently are 
creating a Higher Education system that shows similarity with NPM-characteristics, it seems that 
Flanders is not quiet exactly following the same path. Despite the increase in autonomy, traditional 
HE system’s characteristics remain intact: high state interference, low marketization, strong collegial 
governance. This is interesting because other policy domains in Flanders have been confronted with 
large NPM-type reforms. From that perspective it seems that Portugal has more similarity with the 
Netherlands than Flanders, despite the fact that it belongs to a different administrative tradition and 
despite the fact that it is perceived as a late adopter of NPM.  Similarly it seems that Finland, apart 
from their governance structure, has more similarity with Flanders and is only adopting NPM at a 
rather slow and hesitating pace. 
Third, the Eastern European countries show a mixed picture. While Hungary tries to create more 
autonomy and an increase in competition between HEIs, the funding strategy remains un-
transparent, the vulnerability of HEIs is high, and their autonomy, despite the performance 
orientation, remains low. In other words: Hungary is trying to modernize, and it seems that she is 
adopting NPM-characteristics, but is struggling to leave the former characteristics of its system 
behind. From that perspective is seems that Latvia and Lithuania are ahead: the way NPM has been 
adopted is less ambiguous: competition has increased, together with autonomy and accountability. 
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Striking is that both countries are integrating internal and external stakeholders in their decision 
making bodies, which to some extent already touches at elements of NPG.  
 
Can we discern a pattern within the above patterns? To some extent it seems so. Countries with a 
long tradition of Higher Education do not easily change their core characteristics: England and the 
United States haven’t really changed the philosophy of their system radically, Flanders and Finland 
do not easily leave behind elements of state interference. To some extent this is probably due to the 
philosophy of the HE system: Flanders and Finland have democracy and large access high on their 
agenda, while England and the US perceive high tuition fees as an indicator of quality. The former 
explains the importance of the state, while the latter emphasizes the market philosophy. The Eastern 
European countries, having a Soviet history, are apparently seeking a HE system that fits best the 
societal and economic needs of the country.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
Under the influence of NPM many changes have been introduced in the HE sector in various 
countries. It was termed ‘new’ because of this very reason (Gunter and Fitzgerald, 2013). Never 
before had ‘management’ so clearly been positioned as an alternative to collegial governance, that 
now was perceived as slow and inefficient. Traditional universities were ‘invaded’ by managerialism 
and NPM was an inspiration to steer the sector differently (Amaral, 2008). We identified four main 
reform areas in HE: marketization, budgetary reforms, autonomy complemented by accountability, 
and a new management style. When we look at the described developments, a pattern is visible: 
when reforms are made, they go in the direction that NPM would suggest. This leads to the 
conclusion that NPM has penetrated HE policy of many Western countries. On this basis, policy 
makers have looked to the same instruments to implement reforms. In this way, the general thrust of 
reforms shows similarity across countries: elements of marketization have been introduced, state 
budgets have been reduced and made competitive, autonomy has been granted but has been 
complemented with ex post control, and management structures have been verticalised. 
But although an ‘NPM pattern’ can be discerned in the rationale underlying the ‘modernisation’ of 
HE, we can at the same time identify substantial differences between the countries with regard to 
the actual implementation of NPM-based reforms, that is, the timing, their intensity, and their 
content. Governments have implemented a different mix of instruments, and have put a different 
focus on each of the instruments (for instance, giving priority to budgetary reform). In sum, NPM in 
HE has been and still is a concept underlying HE reforms in many countries, notwithstanding different 
national contexts and administrative traditions. Even in late adopting countries such as Portugal and 
Finland, NPM has a foot in the door. This does not mean, however, that all HE sectors have evolved 
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towards a full NPM model in the actual implementation of reforms, quite on the contrary. Like in 
other policy domains, NPM has found its way in HE and in HEIs, but at a different speed and with 
varied intensity, and always filtered by the national context. Governments use the ‘toolbox’ of NPM 
as they see fit, in the light of policy goals which in many cases include tightening of the governmental 
budget. 
Next to the implementation differences, our country overview resonates with the findings from 
Pollitt and Dan (2011) that it is not clear what the effects of the reforms have been. Research does 
not seem to focus a lot on the actual outcomes and effects of NPM implementation. This makes it 
hard to assess whether NPM reforms have actually led to cost reduction, more efficiency and more 
responsiveness to society. In contrast, some of the general critiques on NPM clearly hold true for 
HE:(1) the economic, neo-liberal background of NPM is often found unfit for HE; (2) elements of the 
collegial system still exist in HE; (3) there is resistance both from the HEIs towards the government 
and within HEIs from academics who do not feel they have more autonomy and who perceive quality 
and performance measurement primarily as an administrative burden of tick-box exercises (compare 
Fumasoli et al., 2014); (4) increased autonomy has not led to a retreat of the government; and (5) 
quality assurance systems were set up as a means of regulating the sector (Jarvis, 2014). In this way, 
those NPM-developments have not led to less but to a different kind of governmental steering which 
could be classified under the concept of ‘the evaluative state’ as referred to by Neave (1998). In 
other words, government continues to govern (Capano, 2011) albeit in other ways, such as digital era 
governance (Peters, 2013) or network governance (Bleiklie et al., 2011; De Wit, 2010; Ferlie et al. 
2009). As a result, we do not have evidence that NPM-inspired reforms have made universities more 
efficient and effective. For a part this is due to the fact that research has not focused on the actual 
outcomes of NPM. But for another part the reason is that NPM is not a ‘package deal’ but rather a 
set of instruments or tools from which policy makers can pick and choose depending on the 
circumstances (policy goals, political resistance, unintended consequences in the implementation 
phase, etc.). Because NPM is an umbrella concept, it is useful as a way to describe changes in HE, as 
we have done in this chapter, but it lacks the conceptual clarity needed to be able to link observed 
effects directly to the concept and its use in HE policy. 
Moreover, the scepticism of post-NPM narratives can also be applied to HE. Although NPM favors 
hierarchisation, it has also led to more horizontal relations within and between markets (Amaral, 
2008). Post-NPM narratives point to degrees of integration, inter-connectedness, and inter-
organizational networking that cannot be captured by the NPM concept. Some have therefore 
proclaimed NPM to be dead (Dunleavy et al. 2005, cited in Gunter and Fitzgerald, 2013). This, 
however, seems to be a claim that comes too early (Gunter and Fitzgerald, 2013): as a concept NPM 
is still pervasive. It can be seen as an ideal type that is for the moment here to stay, just as collegial 
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governance has not been completely uprooted by NPM but has to an extent kept its place alongside 
NPM (Goedegebuure and Hayden, 2007). This is also seen in the public sector where, traditional 
bureaucratic culture persists (Wynen and Verhoest, 2013). However, it is no wonder that post-NPM 
concepts such as New Public Governance are starting to emerge. New Zealand, for instance, as a 
trendsetter outside Europe, is shifting its policy from a neo-liberal discourse towards a more 
controlled market where negotiations and participative decision-making with involvement from 
societal actors gain more prominence. Another example of counter-developments is the case of 
tuition fees in Germany: they were introduced in most Länder in 2007, but were abolished again in 
2014 (Woelert, 2014). It is highly possible that similar ‘waves’ will be identified in other countries in 
the near future. As our analysis showed: governments often use instruments, try them, and change 
policies afterwards. 
 
To conclude, for HE research, the challenge will be to grasp these and similar contemporary 
developments in HE that are focused on connectedness, integration and networking. This will very 
likely lead to the construction of a new ideal type steering model, that will exist next to NPM or 
gradually replace the NPM model.  The essence will be, first, to unpack the narrative behind the new 
concept when it is used in HE as a management ideal, and second, to find consensus on a clear 
definition of the management tools and instruments that are an inherent part of the new concept, in 
order to turn the ideal type into a research concept that can be used to not only describe, but to 
critically analyse and evaluate reforms in HE. Moreover, an important task for higher education 
researchers is not only to focus on the analysis of the developments, but also to pay considerable 
attention to the effects (positive and negative) of future reforms. 
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